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D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and 
LINDA ANN CORAM, 
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Defendants-Appellants. 
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• 
• 
• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a rehearing on the appeal of 
defendant-appellant, D. John Musselman from a denial by the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County , State of 
Utah, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, of defendants motion 
to set aside a default judgment entered against him. 
DISPOSITION 
The lower court denied the motion of the 
defendant-appellant to set aside the default judgment on the 
grounds that the defendant-appellant's proposed answer failed to 
state a defense and thereafter entered its order accordingly. 
The lower court made no finding or ruling, whatsoever, on th~ 
issue of excusable neglect. This honorable court issued a per 
curiam opinion on July 26, 1982 affirming the District Court's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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ruling. On October 8, 1982 this honorable court granted 
defendant's petition for rehearing of the matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent, again, seeks a judgment and order 
affirming the denial of defendant-appellant's motion to set aside 
the default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts (as previously submitted) are 
restated for the purpose of this rehearing. 
Linda Ann Coram obtained a Medicaid grant from the 
State of Utah, Department of Social Services, whereby she 
received the benefit of a total sum of $82,522.22 paid by the 
State of Utah to her medical providers all of which payments 
allegedly resulted from improper treatment by her doctor. She 
assigned to the State the right to recover as against any liable 
third party these medical expenses and in 1979 the Utah 
Legislature enacted the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Section 
55-lSd-l through 17 (re-enacted in 1981 as Section 26-19-1 
through 17), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. (Complaint 
and proposed answer.) 
Defendant-appellant was retained in 1979 to represent 
Linda Ann Coram in a malpractice action against the doctor who 
-2-
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allegedly caused the need for the Medicaid grant which resulted 
in a pre-trial settlement of $150,000.00. Prior to proceeding 
with the case, defendant-appellant contacted the State of Utah, 
Office of Recovery Services and inquired as to the State's 
Medicaid claim of $82,522.22 and thereafter agreed to collect 
said sum out of any recovery, taking for his services the 
statutory 25% contingency fee. When the case was settled, the 
insurance carrier issued two settlement drafts; one was in the 
sum of $67,477.78; payable to Linda Ann Coram, her husband and D. 
john Musselman (defendant-appellant); the other was in the sum of 
$82,522.22 (the exact cmount of the State's Medicaid claim), and 
was payable to Linda Ann Coram, her husband, D. John Musselman 
and the St-ate o-f Utah Office -of-Recovery· Services (emphasis 
added). Both drafts were issued on February 5, 1981. The draft 
in the sum of $82,522.22 shows endorsements as follows: "Linda 
Ann Coram," "William Dyerl Coram," 0 D. John Musselman" and "State 
of Utah Off ice-- of Recovery Services by;· - D; --John Musselman· its 
Attorney at Law and in Fact." (Emphasis added). Affidavit in 
Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Transcript of 
Hearing of August 18, 1981). 
The draft of $82,522.22, hereinafter called "settlement 
draft, 0 was deposited by defendant-appellant in Bank Account No. 
71-31544-3 in the name of D. John Musselman and Associates at the 
Central Bank and Trust Company, Riverside Plaza Office, Provo, 
-3-
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Utah, on or about March 10, 1981, from which account funds were 
taken by D. John Musselman and loaned or otherwise used by him. 
The sum of $50,000.00 was loaned out of this same banK account to 
Vernon Herbst of Blackfoot, Idaho, on April 15, 1981, by means of 
check no. 160, drawn on said Account No. 71-31554-3, whereby said 
Vernon Herbst executed a promissory note which carried interest 
at the rate of 180% per annum (15% per month) and secured the 
promissory note with a deed of trust in which D. John Musselman 
was the named beneficiary. The state did not authorize the 
diverting of its funds obtained from the said settlement draft of 
$82,522.22. (Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment and Affidavit on Order to Show Cause). 
Numerous letters were written to defendant-appellant, 
demanding payment to the state of the money recovered in the 
settlement draft and after many promises to account were not 
kept, the plaintiff-respondent filed a lawsuit, No. C-81-4425, in 
the District Court of the Third Judicial District, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah. (Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. 
After defendant-appellant was served summons and copy 
of said complaint, on June 4, 1981, he promised to account to 
plaintiff-respondent for said settlement draft funds which 
promises he failed to keep. On July 5, 1981, defendant-appellant 
talked on the telephone to a Mr. George Martindale, Investigator 
-4-
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for the Office of Recovery Services, and was advised by Mr. 
Martindale that unless he made an immediate accounting to the 
State of Utah for the settlement draft funds or filed a 
responsive pleading, the attorney for the State of Utah in Case 
No. C-81-4425 would have to default him. (Affidavit in 
Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment). 
No communication was ever received from defendant-
appellant therafter and a default certificate was entered on the 
9th day of July, 1981, and jugment by default was granted and 
docketed on July 14, 1981. (Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment, Default Certificate and Judgment by Default). 
On August 13, 1981, defendant-appellant filed a motion 
to set aside the judgment and noticed said motion for argument on 
the 18th day of August, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. The court 
ruled that notice of the motion did not comply with the rules as 
to time and, therefore, ruled that defendant-appellant would have 
to renotice his motion to set aside the judgment. (Transcript of 
August 18, 1981, p.7, lines 7 through 11). 
A hearing on a supplementary order was set for the same 
day before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor and defendant-appellant 
was then and there sworn under oath to answer questions 
concerning the disposition of the settlement funds. He admitted 
under oath the fee arrangement and acknowledged his endorsement 
of the settlement draft as the •Attorney in Law and in Fact" of 
. . 
_,. 
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the State of Utah Off ice of Recovery Services but thereafter 
took the Fifth Amendment on all other questions regarding the 
~ 
funds obtained from the settlement draft. (Transcript of Hearing 
on August 18, 1981). 
Defendant-appellant was ordered to appear on the 3rd 
day of November, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. before the court of 
the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, Utah, in Civil 
Case No. C-81-4425, to then and there show cause, which order to 
show cause was supported by an affidavit. Defendant-appellant 
did not file a counter-affidavit, nor did he offer to counter any 
of the statements in the supporting affidavit by sworn testimony. 
(Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show Cause). 
The motion of defendant-appellant to set aside the 
default judgment was not noticed up on November 3, 1981, when the 
order to show cause was heard by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor; 
however, counsel for plaintiff-respondent agreed to waive the 
notice requirement and the court thereafter heard oral argument 
on the motion to set aside the judgment from both counsel. Upon 
conclusion of the oral argument, the court denied the motion of 
defendant-appellant to set aside the default judgment on the 
grounds that the purported answer did not state a defense and 
entered its order accordingly, from which order defendant-
appellant appeals. (Transcript of Hearing of November 3, 1981). 
-6-
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This Honorable Court on July 26, 1982, ruled in a 
per curiam decision that the holding of the lower court should be 
affirmed. Thereafter defendant-appellant petitioned this court 
for a rehearing of the matter claiming that this honorable court 
had misconstrued the facts and issues at hand and that defendant-
appellant should be allowed a second hearing on the matter. The 
State of Utah therefore submits this brief on rehearing. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This case comes before this Honorable Court on a 
rehearing based upon the allegations of the defendant-appellant 
that this court materially misconstrued the actions of the lower 
court and the factual situation existing in this case. 
Defendant-appellant claims that his failure to timely answer the 
complaint filed against him by the State of Utah was excusable 
and that he tendered a meritorous defense to the complaint filed 
against him by the State of Utah. It is the position of the 
State of Utah that this court was correct in its initial holding 
and a close examination of the record in the court below will 
sustain that original holding. The defendant-appellant now 
claims that the controlling facts of the case (to which the court 
below found he had no defense and which decision this court 
previously sustained) were "neither ••• admitted or conceded by 
the defendant." An examination of the record of the Third 
-7-
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Judicial District Court will prove that the factual situation 
existing did· ·not require the defendant-appellant to admit or 
~ 
concede any material facts; these being matters which are all 
clearly evident and uncontroverted in the record on file herein. 
From the outset of this case defendant-appellant has 
maintained that there are only two issues involved in this case 
which the court should take into consideration those being: 1. 
Was the conduct of the defendant excusable in failing to timely 
answer the complaint which the State was forced to file against 
him for failuire to account for funds collected on the State's 
behalf? 2. Was there a viable defense available to the 
defendant to the complaint filed against him by the State of 
Utah? 
It is the position of the State of Utah that an 
examination of the record will show that 1. the defendant's 
failure to timely answer the complaint filed against him by the 
State of Utah was not excusable (which issue is not properly 
before this court) and that 2. there is no meritorious defense 
which the-defendant may rely upon against the complaint filed 
against him by the State of Utah. However, the ruling of the 
lower court did not require a decision or finding as to No. 1, 
above, since it ruled as a matter of law that based on the facts 
in the record the defendant did not prof er a valid defense to the 
allegations in the complaint. 
-8-
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The brief of defendant-appellant on rehearing fails to 
address any issues not heretofore presented before this honorable 
court in defendant-appellant's prior briefs. Defendant-appellant 
in attempting to present some kind of a meritorious defense has 
employed a myriad of arguments presented in an obscure, and 
alternative array, many of which actually contradict each other • 
This production of weak if not insipid and redundant attempts at 
defenses should not deter this honorable court f rorn examining 
what actually happened in the court below, what was actually 
stated, under ~ath~ by the defendant-appellant and supported by 
unopposed affidavits all of which was the basis for the ruling of 
the lower court. 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT BY HIS ACTIONS AND REPRESEN-
TATIONS TO THE STATE WAS ACTING AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE, AND LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The defendant-appellant: claims that he at no time 
admitted to the fact that he was representing the State of Utah 
in the civil action of Ms. Coram against her personal physician. 
That defendant-appellant in this appeal denies that he was, in 
fact, representing the State of Utah in this instance does not 
alter the facts as they appear on the record. The original 
complaint filed by the State of Utah against the defendant in its 
first cause of action states: 
-9-
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•That there is no contract between the State 
of Utah and defendant, D. John Musselman 
providing for payment of an attorney's fee to 
said defendant by plaintiff for a recovery of 
the said Eighty-two Thousand Five Hundred 
Twenty-two and 22/100 Dollars ($82,522.22) 
lien claim and that plaintiff is, therefore, 
entitled to recover the entire sum of Eight 
Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-two and 
22/100 Dollars ($82,522.22).• 
In defendant's answer to these allegations as found 
upon page 30 of the record before this court the defendant denied 
paragraph 9 of the State's complaint. A denial of the fact that 
no contract existed between the State of Utah and the defendant 
would be an assertion that in fact a contract did exist between 
the parties. Further in a letter from the defendant to the 
Office of Recovery Services dated February 3, 1981 addressed to 
George Martindale the defendant stated: 
"The total claim of the State of Utah is 
ascertained by deducting from $82,522.22 the 
statutory 25% for attorney's fees which would 
total $20,630.56, which would leave a claim 
for the State of Utah of $61,891.66, minus 
the proportionate share of costs attributable 
to the State. I believ~ the costs at this 
time would reduce that figure to something in 
the neighborhood of $59,000.oo.• 
This letter is on page 43 of the record before this 
court. In every subsequent letter on record before this court 
the defendant makes mention of the attorney's fee which the State 
of Utah is expected to pay·him for his legal servicesi expecting 
fully one quarter of the recovery due to the State of Utah under 
-10-
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the assignment of benefits to the State of Utah by his other 
client, Linda Ann Coram. These material representations and 
claims, in and of themselves, are clear proof that the defendant 
represented himself as being the legal counsel for the State of 
Utah in this particular recovery. 
Even more convincing than the representations of the 
defendant which he made (as to this attorney-client relationship) 
to the members of the Department of Social Services, Off ice of 
Recovery Services of the State of Utah, and to his other client 
Linda Ann Coram, is the representation of being the State's 
attorney which he made to the insurance company of Doctor Boston 
(the defendant in the original medical malpractice suit) that he 
was in fact the attorney representing the State of Utah. On the 
reverse side of the actual draft in settlement of this assigned 
claim of the State of Utah (R.52) is written: 
D. John Musselman 
State of Utah 
Office of Recovery Services by: D. John 
Musselman 
Its: Attorney at law and in fact 
This settlement draft was the object of close 
examination in the court below (R.120-122) in which the defendant 
a-dmitted that he did -sign- the drafts and did withhold the 
settlement -amount which he accepted as a representative of the 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State of Utah, Department of Recovery Services. 
It is the position of the State of Utah that the 
defendant cannot deny that he was acting as the legal~counsel for 
the State of Utah in the recovery of the assigned medicaid claim 
in the legal action taken against Dr. Boston. It is clear on the 
face of the record that representations made by the defendant-
appellant to the Depart~ent of Social Services Off ice of Recovery 
Services of the State of Utah when preparing to take legal action 
and thereafter that he undertook, as the State's attorney, the 
recovery of the medicaid claim and that by admissions before the 
court below that he did, in fact, sign the settlement draft as 
the representative and attorney of the State of Utah, Department 
of Recovery Services. Therefore, he need not formally admit, llQ.I. 
may -be· deny the fact that he was acting as attorney for the State 
of Utah and that he owed a fiduciary obligation to his client, 
the State of Utah, in this matter. The facts in the record speak 
for him. It is also unnecessary for the defendant to admit the 
fact that after negotiating and obtaining from the said draft the 
sum of Eighty-two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-two and 22/100 
Dollars ($82,522.22) in the name of the State of Utah as 
settlement of an assignment of Benefits claim from his other 
clients (Mr. and Mrs. Coram), he intentionally withheld and 
misused those funds to his own personal gain. 
-12-
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The brief of the defendant-appellant is an insult to 
the intelligence and the integrity of this court and is a last 
gasp attempt by the defendant to avoid facing the consequences of 
his actions. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BY THE 
COURT BELOW WAS NOT BASED UPON EITHER 
SPECIFIC PLEADING OF THE COMPLAINT. 
In defendant's brief it is alleged that because of the 
amount of the judgment against defendant that the judgment of the 
court could only be based upon one of the two causes of actiQn 
filed in the original complaint (R.2-5). This is an incorrect 
assumption upon the part of the defendant, the trial court having 
the discretion to rule upon the causes of action individually and 
grant whatever judgment it deemed fit. Because the amount prayed 
for in the first cause of action was the amount awarded by the 
court, defendant assumes that this is the only cause of action 
ruled on by the court. This is a misinterpretation of the record 
and the facts in this case. Nowhere on the record does the 
court specifically exclude the plaintiff-respondent's second 
cause of action, nor does it rule only on the first cause of 
action. The court's initial judgment was one of default for 
reasons of defendant's failure to timely answer the complaint 
against him. Upon hearing in the court below on the 3rd day of 
~· 
' . ~ ~ . 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
November, 1981, defendant orally requested the court to set aside 
the judgment to which the court stated (R.111) 
I have read your proposed answer and I don't 
think it states any defense. Motion to set 
aside the default is denied. 
The court never addressed the issues of the complaint 
individually but only held that the defendant failed to state a 
defense which would merit the setting aside of the judgment 
(R.87) 
The original default judgment (R.9) stated only that 
the State of Utah would be awarded a certain sum of money, that 
sum being the amount requested in the first cause of action. 
However if this honorable court will examine that judgment and 
the following documents on the record before this court, it will 
find that there was no specific ruling on either of ·the causes of 
action listed in the complaint of the plaintiff-respondent and 
therefore defendant's allegations that the first cause of action 
is the only controlling issues is fallacious in nature. 
POINT III 
THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PURSUE ITS 
ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS CLAIM AGAINST MRS. 
CORAM IS ANCILLARY TO THIS CASE 
A good deal of defendant's brief is taken up in 
discussing the merits and statutory requirements concerning the 
rights of the State of Utah against his former clients, Mr. & 
-14-
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Mrs. Coram. This discussion has little bearing on the case at 
hand. The issue which is squarely before this court is whether 
the defendant by signing the settlement draft as "the attorney at 
law and in fact" for the State of Utah after making 
representations to departments of the State of Utah that he was 
acting as the attorney for the State and that he expected the 
statutory fee of 25% of the recovery as his attorney's fees, 
[which incidently he still maintains in argument I B(S) page 18 
of his brief on rehearing before this court,] was in violation of 
his fiduciary duty to the State of Utah in withholding the above 
stated funds and thereafter misappropriating those funds for his 
own personal benefit. The court below recognized that the 
pleadings of the defendant to this end were merely delaying 
tactics which stated no actual defense to the charges leveled 
against him. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INADVERTENCE AND 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS WITHOUT MERIT 
In the motion to set aside the judgment made before the 
court below and every subsequent attempt to set aside that 
judgment the defendant-appellant has claimed that because of a 
medical condition [from which the defendant-appellant alleges he 
was suffering] he inadvertently failed to answer the complaint 
filed against him by the State in the time required by statute. 
' .. 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 55A(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
the elements of a default judgment. Rule 3B of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure states the time on which the allotted number of 
days begins to run, that being the time of service upon the party 
defendant to the suit. Rule 12A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that 20-days shall be allowed after service of a 
complaint for the reply of the party defendant to said complaint. 
After this statutory period of time has run under Utah law a 
default judgment may be entered against the party defendant at 
any time as provided by Rule 55A(l) above. The summons required 
by the above stated statutory rules of civil procedure was served 
on the 4t-h day of June, 1981 by Deputy Sheriff Vest (R.7). 
Thereafter defendant had-20 daysi as allowed by the above stated 
rules to file an answer to the complaint which was filed against 
him by the State of Utah. An examination of the calendar for 
June of 1981 will disclose that statutorily the defendant was 
-reguir·ed to fi-le his· answer by ·the· 24th of June, 1981 (a 
Wedesday). At any point thereafter the State of Utah would have 
been justified in defaulting the defendant. In the brief of the 
defendant-appellant (Page 5) he states that on approximately June 
29, 1981, he was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital, Provo, 
Utah, for severe stomach ailment. This admittance to the 
Hospital was on an emergency basis and it can be assumed that up 
and until this point and time the defendant was fully capable to 
-16-
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carry on his business affairs. From the return of service above 
stated on the record before this court the defendant had failed 
to reply to the complaint of the State of Utah before being 
admitted to the hospital for his stomach condition. Therefore, 
the defendant cannot in good faith claim that excusable neglect 
or inadvertance caused him to fail to reply to the complaint of 
the plaintiff's in the time allotted by the statute, he being 
admitted to the hospital on the fifth day after the statutory 
period of time for filing of his answer had run and another 
twelve days elapsed after his release from the hospital in which 
to file a responsive pleading. The record indicates that the 
defendant was stalling for time and that he continued to stall 
for time to collect on his "investment of the $50,000.00 and 
with the collection of this principal sum and interest of 
$7,500.00 a month from April 14, 1981, he hoped to pay off the 
state's claim before any of these sordid facts came to light. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts in the record before this 
court show that the defendant by his representations to employees 
of the Department of Social Services and the Off ice of Recovery 
Services of the State of Utah, by his demand for the statutorily 
allowed 25% attorney's fees for the recovery, and, finally, and 
the most convincing, his signature upon the settlement draft as " 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attorney at law and in fact• for the State of Utah, had a 
fiduciary duty to the Off ice of Recovery Services and the State 
of Utah to pay over the settlement funds of the formally executed 
assignment of benefits of Mrs. Coram to the Department. His 
acquisition of the funds as the State's attorney and misuse of 
those funds for his own personal benefit, which-are-·all clearly 
established by the record in· the court below, are the issues 
squarely before this court. His position in this case, as was 
recognized by the court below, is indefensable, and, therefore, 
the decision of the court below to deny his motion to set aside 
the default judgment was proper and should be upheld by this-
court. 
The defendant's only claim before the court below to 
support his motion was that of inadvertance and execusable 
neglect. As has been demonstrated by the plaintiff-respondent, 
the statutory period of time allowed under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for an answer after the date of service upon the 
defendant had run many days, both prior to the defendant's 
unfortunate, and sudden medical condition and thereafter before 
the entry of the default judgment. The defendant can not in good 
faith claim that his medical condition was the reason for his 
failure to answer the complaint filed against him by the State of 
Utah his medical problem accounting for only four of the twenty 
days beyond the defaulting period) and, therefore, even the claim 
-18-
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of excusable neglect is totally without defense or justification 
in this matter. One can only surmise and draw conclusions, based 
on the foregoing established facts, that defendant-appellant's 
failure to join issue and thereby open the door of discovery and 
the consequences from such inquiry was weighed by him against the 
chances of recovery of the $50,000.00 with accrued interest and 
the subsequent settlement with his client the State of Utah 
(which would have closed the door on any litigation and discovery 
on the misuse of the recovery funds, and he chose to gamble on 
the latter and lost. The record in this conclusion speaks for 
itself. 
The decision of the court below to deny the defendant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment was, as can be clearly 
ascertained by a review of the record before this court, 
justified and therefore this court should, on the basis of the 
foregoing facts and the law peviously cited, affirm the decision 
of the lower court as it did previously. 
Dated this _-_,~lo _____ day of December, 1982. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
LEON A. HALGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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